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In deregulated airline markets, carriers are free to choose the values of the vari-
ables a®ecting their pro¯ts. Out of the large number of decisions to be made in
practice, the decisions on °ight frequency and price on each route in an airlines
network are of major importance. Frequency, or the number of °ights o®ered per
unit of time, determines consumer welfare by a®ecting not only the gap between
desired departure times and actual departure times, but also the transfer time of
passengers who are not on direct °ights. Also, total °ight frequency has a negative
external e®ect on households su®ering from noise and emission of pollutants. In-
terpreting frequency as quality of service, the frequency decision a®ects both the
number of passengers and their willingness to pay. On the other hand, frequency
clearly is a major determinant of airline costs, so that quality is costly to provide.
Furthermore, frequency a®ects both quality of service and - given aircraft size -
capacity at the same time and can thus be assumed to in°uence prices. A further
basic aspect of airline markets is the small number of competitors, implying that
competing carriers take the possible reactions of their opponents into account
when making decisions, e.g., on frequencies and prices. Finally, it has been ob-
served that prices in the airline industry are adjusted daily, whereas changes in
frequency (schedules) can be assumed to be much less °exible.
The present paper wishes to model airline competition while taking into ac-
count the above observations. Consumer demand is a®ected by price, schedule
delay and transfer time, while the latter two are determined by the airlines' fre-
quency decisions. We consider airline behaviour in a small airline network, under
monopoly and duopoly competition respectively and we restrict the analysis to
situations where at least one of the ¯rms in the market operates a hub-and-spoke
(HS) system. The di®erence in decision °exibility between frequency and price
is accounted for by modeling airline competition as a two stage game: in the
¯rst stage, airlines choose schedules, i.e. °ight frequencies for each link in their
network, while in the second stage, having observed the respective ¯rst stage
choices, they choose prices. The equilibrium is thus computed as the subgame
perfect Nash solution in schedules. A central policy issue addressed by the model
is the welfare e®ect induced by airline deregulation, de¯ned as the introduction
of competition in (a part of) the network.
1Financial support from the Netherlands' Organization for Scienti¯c Research is gratefully
acknowledged.A number of articles in the large literature on airline (network) competition
and deregulation are particularly relevant for this paper. The model has the same
two stage structure as the network design model in Lederer (1993), but di®ers
in two ways. Firstly, customer demand is distributed with respect to preferred
departure times, so that there is not one least price 'path' per origin-destination
(OD) market and more than one ¯rm provide transport between OD markets
in equilibrium. Secondly, demand in each market is elastic with respect to both
frequency and price.2 Brueckner and Spiller (1991) use a model of quantity setting
duopoly competition in a network; they conclude that with returns to density
or cost complementarities in a network, competition in a part of the network
may result in an overall welfare decrease because of the negative externalities
imposed on the other passengers in the system. Using a similar model Nero
(1996) concludes that airline deregulation unambiguously improves welfare in the
network when returns to density are absent. The present paper analyzes the
introduction of competition in a simple network using the two-stage schedule
competition model outlined above.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce and calibrate the model in
the next section, and discuss some of its properties. We then consider simulated
market outcomes under monopoly and duopoly competition for two simple airline
networks. Section 3 discusses monopoly and leg competition in a one-hub network.
In section 4, monopoly and duopoly solutions in a network with two hubs are




A base assumption of the model is that at least one airline operates a hub-and-
spoke (HS) system. Therefore, passengers °y either directly to their destination
(local passengers) or have to transfer to a connecting °ight (connecting passen-
gers). Connecting passengers are assumed to use the services of one airline only
during their trip. Furthermore, we do not consider demand for which more than
2Furthermore, passengers are assumed not to 'bundle' °ights, i.e., not to switch between
airlines when when making a transfer. Lederer (1993) shows that such bundling may lead to
non-existence of the price equilibrium.
3one transfer is necessary, so that connecting passengers are on two °ights dur-
ing their trip, passing through two spokes or legs s via a hub. Passengers make
one-way trips between nodes (cities) in the network, so that the market m for
transport between cities Y and Z represents two one-way markets mY !Z and
mZ!Y .
A traveler derives gross utility v from making a trip, and faces a price p.
Furthermore, a consumer su®ers a linear schedule delay cost µ1x when the °ight
leaves at a time distance x = jtdep ¡ tprefj from his or her preferred departure
time,3 and a linear travel time cost µ2d, where d is the duration of the trip. Given
the network layout, trip duration in the model is ¯xed for local passengers, whereas
it depends on the departure frequency on the second spoke travelled during the
trip for connecting passengers. When the gross valuation exceeds the sum of price,
schedule delay cost and travel time cost, the traveler buys a ticket. We note that
the schedule delay of a connecting passenger is determined by the departure time
of the ¯rst of his two °ights, whereas his travel time is partly determined by the
departure time of the second °ight.
Consumer preferences with respect to departure time are represented by a
circle of (time) length L on which potential passengers are distributed uniformly.
The departure times of °ights on a particular leg of the network are also located
on this time circle: we consider the departure times of °ights i and i + 1, ti and
ti+1 respectively, which are separated by headway H. Flights are spaced equally
on the circle. Therefore, the headway is determined endogenously as the time
length of the circle divided by the total number of °ights F o®ered by airlines on





Potential passengers who are 'located' at some preferred departure time x 2 (0;H)
face a time distance x with respect to the departure time ti of °ight i and a distance
(H ¡ x) with respect to ti+1. These potential passengers derive the following net
utilities or consumer surplus from the two options:
vi = v ¡ pi ¡ µ1x ¡ µ2d (2.2)
vi+1 = v ¡ pi+1 ¡ µ(H ¡ x) ¡ µ2d
3We thus make the assumption that the utility loss caused by taking a °ight at a time
distance x earlier than the preferred departure time is equal to the utility loss caused by taking
a °ight at x later than the preferred departure time. The term 'schedule delay cost' is meant to
capture both types of utility loss.
4Clearly, a consumer will choose the °ight belonging to the larger of the above
expressions and buy a ticket if the net utility is positive. For the moment, we
shall assume that the travel time of the two options is equal. We can now derive
the distance xb between ti and the boundary between the market areas of the two
°ights as that value of x for which vi = vi+1. This gives
xb+ =
pi+1 ¡ pi + µ1H
2µ1
(2.3)
All potential passengers located between ti and xb+ will take °ight i, if they °y at
all, and those located between xb+ and ti+1 will choose °ight i + 1, again, if they
°y at all. The number of passengers with preferred departure time x 2 (0;xb+)
actually taking °ight i is calculated as the number of potential passengers with
gross utilities vi > pi+ µ1x+µ2d; we represent this number by D¢g (pi + µ1x + µ2d),
where D is a density parameter. Demand for °ight i from potential passengers
with preferred departure times x ¸ ti can be obtained by adding the number of
passengers over all preferred departure times x between ti and xb+. We include the




g(pi + µ1x + µ2d)dx (2.4)
Aggregate demand for °ight i is calculated as the sum of direct passengers and
connecting passengers who choose the °ight on the ¯rst leg of their journey.
We now consider the demand for travel in one-way market mY !Z, which is
either a direct market for local passengers on spoke s or a transfer market for
which s is the ¯rst spoke to be travelled. Aggregate demand for market mY !Z
is found by summing qmY !Z;i over all °ights. Thus, for an airline l operating a





4The location xb¡ which marks the boundary between the market areas of °ight i and an




5Finally, total demand for city-pair market Y Z is the sum of the demand in the
two one-way markets mY !Z and mZ!Y respectively.
2.2. Con¯gurations
We proceed by analyzing the duopoly con¯guration of °ights in a particular time
period, represented by the circular 'time' market. For notational convenience,
we consider a one-way non-stop duopoly market in the following. Consider a
departure i operated by airline l. There are three possibilities: departure i may
have either two, one or zero neighbouring departures o®ered by a competing airline
¡l; we refer to such departures as 'unfriendly neighbours', while we call two
neighbouring °ights operated by one and the same airline 'friendly neighbours'.
The expression for the market boundary xb in the demand per °ight function q
depends on the con¯guration of the departures. With an interlaced con¯guration,
for each departure i the price for both the earlier and the later departure (i ¡ 1
and i+1 respectively) is set non-cooperatively by a competing airline. Note that
each airline sets one and the same price for all its tickets, i.e., there is no price
di®erentiation between departures of one ¯rm.5 A departure i with two unfriendly
neighbours faces market boundaries
xb¡ =
pi¡1 ¡ pi + µH
2µ
xb+ =
pi+1 ¡ pi + µH
2µ
(2.6)
from which demand for °ight i is derived using equation (2.4). We refer to the
demand for this type of °ight as qcc or completely competitive demand.
In the case of a non-competitive °ight (with no unfriendly neighbours), demand
is derived from the market boundaries




because prices are the same for these °ights. We refer to this type of demand
as qnc.6 We note that for any speci¯cation of the demand function, completely
competitive demand is more price sensitive than non-competitive demand.
5Therefore, in case of a duopoly the price of both competing departures is the same.
6An explicit analysis of demand for the intermediate case of a 'semi-competitive' °ight i ,
i.e., a °ight with only one unfriendly neighbour i¡1 and one friendly neighbour i+1 is omitted.
6For the market as a whole, we can now distinguish between two extremes. In
a monopoly market, all departures are o®ered by the same airline; on the other
hand, there is the completely interlaced equilibrium, in which all °ights have un-
friendly neighbours. Of course, there are many possible con¯gurations between
these extremes. The range of con¯gurations implies that with multiproduct com-
petition, monopoly and oligopoly become relative rather than absolute concepts.













A slightly asymmetric non-
interlaced duopoly
configuration
Figure 1: Multiproduct con¯gurations
Note that the number of such °ights is always a multiple of 2, and we therefore rewrite the
demand for two 'semi-competitive' °ights as the demand for one competitive °ight qcc and one
non-competitive °ight qnc.
7The ¯rst con¯guration in ¯gure 1 is a completely interlaced duopoly. When a
duopolist analyzes the e®ect of a unit increase in departure frequency starting from
a symmetric interlaced con¯guration, he necessarily considers a 'slightly asymmet-
ric' con¯guration. As is illustrated in ¯gure 1b, all non-symmetric duopoly con-
¯gurations are non-interlaced. An implication of the model structure is that the
form of the demand functions in an airline duopoly changes at fl = f¡l.7 Aggre-
gate demand over all departures Q consists of two parts. For airline l, aggregate
demand in the market is
Ql = flqcc if fl · f¡l (2.8)
Ql = (fl ¡ f¡l)qnc + f¡lqcc if fl > f¡l (2.9)













The demand and pro¯t function of both duopoly airlines have the exact same
form. Clearly, when the ¯rst line of the demand function is relevant for one
airline, the second is relevant for the other. Only when fl = f¡l, the two parts of
the demand function give the same value.
2.3. Cost and pro¯t
For each °ight, the costs consist of a (major) ¯xed part FC and a marginal cost
c per passenger. The model assumes that each airline l charges a single ticket
price for each city-pair market m;m = 1;:::;Ml it operates. Furthermore, airlines
decide on the °ight schedule, that is, the departure frequency for each spoke
s;s = 1;:::;Sl in their network. Thus, airline behaviour is represented by the
7Here and in the following, the subscript ¡l refers to the competitor of airline l.
8vectors ¹ pl = fp1;:::;pMlg and ¹ fl = ff1;:::;fSlg. Using (2.5) and (2.1), pro¯ts of













For the calibration of the model we follow the procedure in Norman and Stran-
denes (1994), viz., solving for the demand parameters using price, frequency, cost
and demand observations for a base monopoly situation in combination with the
monopolist's ¯rst order conditions. Firstly, we impose a linear form on the point
demand function g (:) in (2.4):8
g(p+ µ1x + µ2d) = ® ¡ p ¡ µ1x ¡ µ2d (2.11)




g (:)dx = 2Dxb
µ






Data are available for a non-stop monopoly route only. We note that for such
a trip, the monopolists ¯rst order conditions only refer to price and frequency
on the leg. With the demand equation, we have a system of three equations,
which allows solving for the three demand parameters D; b ®; and µ1,9 with b ® =
® ¡ µ2d. The data thus do not enable us to directly infer a value for µ2, which
represents the common value of travel time. Morrison and Winston (1989) report
estimated values of travel and transfer time to be much higher (a factor 10 and
20, respectively) than the value of schedule delay. The relative values seem to
depend on the type of traveler. As indicated by Morrison and Winston, business
travelers are likely to have a much higher relative value of µ1 than other travelers.
Dobson and Lederer (1993), use a value of schedule delay higher than the value
8The demandspeci¯cation ultimately depends onthe assumeddistributionof gross valuations
v. A well known alternative is the negative exponential distribution, as used in e.g. Evans
(1987). However, that speci¯cation does not allow one to solve the calibration equations for the
parameters of the model. The speci¯cation used here is conform Greenhut et al. (1987).
9Data refer to the pre-deregulation Tel Aviv - Eilat monopoly, and consist of price, frequency
and passenger observations. Furthermore, we dispose of passenger and per °ight cost data.
9of travel time in their simulation model, while Berechman and de Wit (1996) use
a single value of time to calculate utility as a function of °ight frequency for local
and connecting passengers.10 Given the scarcity of evidence and the di±culty of
comparing parameter values between rather di®erent models, we do not assign
a ¯xed value to µ2 here. Rather, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to
changes in the relative value, and look for restrictions on the parameter value in
the next section.
As indicated above, for local passengers, the utility loss caused by the time
involved in the trip is represented by the parameter b ® = ® ¡ µ2d. For connecting
passengers, the calculation di®ers on three accounts. Firstly, the trip consists of
two leg °ights. Secondly, the connecting passengers have to wait for a connecting
°ight. Thirdly, the gross trip valuation may di®er between non-stop and on-
stop travel. In order to simplify the calculations, we have assumed the following.
For connecting passengers', gross trip valuation is higher than for local passengers,
e.g., because of the larger travel distance. However, the di®erence in trip valuation
is exactly matched by the utility loss derived from the incremental travel time.
Therefore, the parameter b ® has the same value for both passenger types. The
di®erence between the demand functions, however, stems from the waiting time
of the connecting passengers, which depends on the frequency of the airline on
the second leg of the trip. We thus have, for connecting passengers




where ¹ is a parameter indicating proportion of the headway time on the second
leg which the passenger has to wait, with 0 · ¹ · 1. Thus, even at a low frequency
on the second leg, the waiting time can be small when arrival and departure times
of connecting °ights are close. We have chosen an arbitrary value of ¹ = 0:5 in
the calculations. The base set of parameters is presented in Table 1, with all
monetary equivalents in US$.












Using these parameter values, we simulated frequency and price decisions in
network markets. The simulation results are presented and discussed in the next
sections.
3. A one-hub network
In this section, we consider the e®ects of introducing competition in a simple
network consisting of one hub and two spokes, as depicted in Figure 2. We assume
that the network is symmetric in the sense that legs 1 and 2 have the same length,
and that all markets have the same density. Using the same type of aircraft on








We ¯rst consider the schedule choice of a monopolist, who operates a HS system
in the above network. As the monopolist does not have to take into account the














where M is the number of markets, and S the numebr of spokes. Clearly, the
number of spokes is two, so that ¹ f = ff1;f2g. We distinguish three city-pair
markets, viz., the local markets AH and HB, and the connecting market AB, so
that ¹ p = fpAH;pHB;pABg.
We start by considering the price solution of the monopolist. Using (2.12), we









We may conclude that, for given °ight frequency, the pro¯t maximizing monopoly
price decreases in both µ1 and µ2, and so, given (2.12), revenues decrease in both
parameters. Similarly, we can derive a expression for the frequency decision of








Next, we analyze the simultaneous solution to the monopoly network problem
(3.1). Using the parameters from Table 1, we solve for ¹ f and ¹ p for varying µ2, we
have calculated pro¯t maximizing frequencies and prices for a range of values of
µ2. The results are presented in Figure 3, which only shows results for one of the
two identical local markets and legs.

































































As Figure 3 illustrates, the price in the connecting market decreases in µ2,
as the travel time costs increase. The monopolist can counteract the negative
demand e®ect by increasing the departure frequency in the legs (which has a
small positive e®ect on the price in the direct market). The pro¯t maximizing
frequency is concave in µ2. Clearly, the overall e®ect of an increase in µ2 on pro¯t
is negative. From this conclusion, we can derive a restriction on the value of µ2.
From the calibration data, we know the pro¯t of a single leg market. A monopolist
will choose a HS network, whenever the pro¯t of such a network is larger than
the pro¯t in a fully-connected (FC) network. Therefore, from the assumption
that the monopolist operates a HS network, a maximum value for µ2 follows, viz.,
the value of µ2 = c µ2 for which the pro¯t of both network types are equal. Put
di®erently, values of µ2 have to be consistent with the choice of the network type.
In the following simulations, we use the maximum value of µ2 consistent with the
HS network type, viz., µ2 = 0:8 ¤ µ1.
3.2. Leg competition
We now consider the introduction of competition in leg 1 of the network in Figure
2, e.g., after entry of a small airline only serving the local market between H and
B. An important asymmetry is thus present in the competition in market 1. The
13incumbent, airline 1, carries both local and connecting passengers on leg 1, while
the entrant, airline 2, only carries local passengers.
We consider the outcome of the following two-stage frequency and price game.












with M1 = 3;M2 = 1 and S1 = 2;S2 = 1. The equilibrium is found by solving
the game backwards: for each pair of schedules f ¹ f1; ¹ f2g the Nash equilibrium in
prices f¹ p¤
1; ¹ p¤
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´
; l = 1;2 (3.5)
(Note that for airline 2, the problem is con¯ned to ¯nding a single departure
frequency and a single price). Given the second stage price equilibria, the ¯rst
























; l = 1;2 (3.6)
The ¯rst stage equilibrium choices and market outcomes are compared with the
monopoly solution in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Market equilibria: 1 hub network
Monopoly Leg competition
airline 1 airline 2
schedules f29;29g f26;29g 13
prices f76;76;54g f66;76;52g 57
passengers f1673;1673;1161g f1330;1673;1113g 820
pro¯t 121221 87410 16944
CS ('000) per market f62:4;62:4;31:5g f99:9;62:4;29:6g
CS total 156326 191952
welfare 277547 296307
We note a few interesting characteristics of the equilibrium. As explained in
section 2, asymmetric frequency choices result in non-interlaced con¯gurations
14of departures. This confers the monopoly power to the airline with the higher
number of departures, which explains the asymmetry in pricing. Clearly, the
schedule asymmetry is determined by the network asymmetry: for airline 1, the
marginal °ight has a higher pro¯tability because it serves both the local duopoly
market and the monopoly market for connecting passengers.
The overall conclusion is that leg competition raises welfare. Not surprisingly,
a reallocation of surplus from producers to consumers takes place. Aggregate con-
sumer surplus increases by some 23%, which represents a gain for local travelers
in market 1 (60%), a loss for connecting passengers (-6%), while nothing changes
for local passengers in market 2. Note that the welfare loss for connecting pas-
sengers caused by airline 1's frequency decrease in leg 1 is partly compensated
by the lower ticket price. This conclusion is partly in line with the conclusion by
Brueckner and Spiller (1991). In their model, leg competition raises welfare for
local passengers in market 1 and hurts connecting passengers too. The reason for
the latter welfare e®ect is, however, the existence of negative cost externalities
between markets, which also causes a welfare reduction for local passengers in
market 2. In our model, connecting passengers are a®ected through the higher
costs of schedule delay and travel time, not through an increase in price (marginal
cost). Therefore, local passengers in market 2 are not a®ected, while local pas-
sengers in market 1 bene¯t from both higher °ight frequencies and lower prices.
Note that the two-stage character of the model gives both airlines an incentive
not to choose symmetric frequencies: with a symmetric, interlaced con¯guration
of departures, price competition is more intense and second stage prices are lower
than in a non-symmetric equilibrium. Finally, we note that the model outcomes
represent a slight S-curve e®ect, that is, airline 1, carries a share of the passengers
traveling on leg 1 that is higher than it's share of departures. The e®ect is a result
of the connecting travel carried by airline 1 while having a lower than proportional
share of the local tra±c, as a result of the high price in market 1.
4. A two-hub network
In this section, we investigate the solution of ¯rms to the network frequency-price
problem for a slightly more complex network under regimes of monopoly and
competition. The network under consideration now consists of 2 hubs and three










The monopoly network problem has the same general form as for the one-hub
network presented in (3.1). In this case, however, S = 3 and we distinguish M = 5
city pair markets, viz., three markets for local passengers AH1, H1H2, H2B and
two markets for connecting passengers AH2 and H1B.11 The monopoly network
problem can be interpreted either as the scheduling problem of a single airline
operating two hubs or a as the problem of two airlines maximizing joint pro¯ts.
In the latter interpretation, local market H1H2 may represent a route market
between hubs of °ag carriers before deregulation in the European Union, which
until recently were governed by restrictive bilaterals, while the other markets can
be thought of as hinterland monopoly markets in the absence of cabotage, e.g.,
as in Nero (1996).
Using the same parameters as in the one-hub system, the (base) solution to
the monopoly scheduling problem is f = ff1;f2;f3g = f36;29;29g and p =
fpH1H2;pAH1;pH2B;pAH2;pH1Bg = f79;76;76;58;58g. As before, µ2 = 0:8 ¤ µ1, a
value at which the HS system is slightly more pro¯table than the FC system. As
before, equilibrium pro¯t decreases in µ2.
4.2. Hub competition
We now consider the case of competition on the local market H1H2. The sit-
uation can be interpreted as an example of partial deregulation, in the sense
that a collusive bilateral, containing capacity and fare restrictions is abolished for
the international route H1H2, while carriers continue to operate monopoly routes
11As indicated before, we do not consider trips for which more than one transfer is necessary.
16within their respective countries. The model assumes that two identical airlines
with identical hinterland markets compete on H1H2. In the following, airline 1
operates the monopoly markets AH1 and AH2, and airline 2 operates monopoly
markets H2B and H1B.
The results of the base simulation are compared with the monopoly regime in
Table 3.
Table 3
Market equilibria: 2 hub network
Monopoly Hub competition
airline 1 airline 2
schedule f36;29;29g f24;28g f21;28g
prices f79;76;76;58;58g f54;76;50g f52;76;47g
passengers f1735;1673;1673;1242;1242g f1265;1661;1059g f1171;1661;987g
A basic characteristic of the equilibrium is the asymmetric frequency choice
on leg 1. This result is due to the second stage price competition: airlines have
an incentive to avoid symmetry, as this results in lower equilibrium prices.12 In
equilibrium, airline 1 operates 3 monopoly °ights, which enables it to charge a
higher price in the duopoly market H1H2. The higher frequency of airline 1 in leg
1 also lowers schedule delay and travel time for its transfer passengers relative to
those of airline 2, so that the price in market AH2 is higher than in airline 2's
transfer market H1B.
A comparison of the monopoly and hub competition regime shows that the
individual duopoly airlines have a lower °ight frequency on each leg than the mo-
nopolist. On legs 2 and 3, the di®erence is quite small. On leg 1, however, the
individual °ight frequencies are much lower with competition, while the combined
°ight frequency on this leg is much higher. As we have assumed that connecting
passengers never transfer to a °ight operated by an other airline, the connecting
passengers su®er from higher travel times as a result from the decrease in airline
°ight frequency. This decrease in utility is re°ected by the lower transfer demand
12Although the model is di®erent, the results are close the those obtained in two-stage quality-
price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982) , where ¯rms di®erentiate in order to avoid price
competition. In fact, there are two pure strategy asymmetric equilibria with identical ¯rms,
only one of which is presented. Furthermore, we do not consider mixed strategies here.
17and the much lower prices in the transfer markets of both airlines. The local pas-
sengers in duopoly market H1H2 do bene¯t, both from increased °ight frequency
and lower prices because of price competition. In this market, there is a signi¯cant
increase in passengers.
In Table 4 below, welfare results of both regimes are compared, where the
welfare total is de¯ned as the sum of consumer surplus in all markets plus industry
pro¯t. A ¯rst result of deregulation in market H1H2 is a dramatic decrease in
industry pro¯t. Secondly, there is an increase in total consumer surplus. The
table shows that the aggregate increase is the sum of a gain for local passengers (in
market H1H2) and losses for connecting passengers. The result of these opposing
changes is a net decrease in the welfare sum.13
Table 4
Welfare results: 2 hub model
Monopoly Hub competition
industry pro¯t 215016 138545
CS ('000) per market f66;62;62;40;40g f127;62;62;28;31g
CS total 269875 309454
welfare 484891 447999
The general welfare result above is qualitatively in line with earlier work on
the e®ect of deregulation in network markets. Nero (1996), using a similar HS net-
work, concludes that for particular parameter combinations in his model, welfare
(the sum of consumer surplus and pro¯ts) over all markets in the network is higher
under monopoly (after an airline merger) than under competition. Brueckner and
Spiller (1991) reach a similar conclusion for leg competition. In these papers,
the form of the cost function drives the results. In particular, the cost function
re°ects increasing returns to tra±c density, that is, marginal passenger costs are
decreasing.
In our model, marginal passenger costs are constant, so that network external-
ities take the form of demand rather than cost complementarities. This di®erence,
which follows from the model speci¯cation, has a number of implications. As indi-
cated in the previous section (leg competition), the introduction of competition in
13In a number of simulations, the sensitivity of the welfare results with respect to the value
of travel time parameter µ2 has been investigated for parameters in the range 0:2µ1 · µ2 · µ1.
As is to be expected, the negative welfare e®ect of deregulation increases in µ2; the qualitative
conclusions remain, however, unchanged.
18a local market does not result in higher marginal costs and prices for connecting
passengers in our model. Rather, prices decrease for connecting passengers, as
their net trip utility decreases in travel time. However, consumer surplus for con-
necting passengers still decreases, as the price decrease does not compensate the
travel time increase. Similarly, the marginal passenger cost of local passengers,
e.g. in market AH1, is constant, so that demand, price and consumer surplus
changes, if any, are due to changes in the °ight frequency on leg 2. The consumer
surplus change is still positive, but is smaller than the pro¯t decrease, so that the
overall welfare e®ect is negative in the two hub model.
Finally, we note that external costs have not been taken into account in the
analysis. However, one can expect increased environmental costs in the network,
e.g. taking the form of noise and emissions, after deregulation. The e®ects are
not evenly spread over the network. Whereas there is a slight decrease in aircraft
movements at airports A and B, there a signi¯cant net increase at the hub airports.
Clearly, including the external cost to the analysis would only add to the negative
welfare result for the hub competition model.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of schedule competition in simple airline networks.
We model airline competition in frequencies and prices as a two stage game: in the
¯rst stage, airlines choose frequencies on the legs in their network, in the second
stage they choose prices for direct and connecting markets. The two-stage setup
of the model allows airlines to choose asymmetric frequency equilibria such that
price competition is avoided. We consider pro¯t maximizing schedule solutions
for two types of networks, and compare monopoly solutions with competition in
part of the network.
The numerical results indicate that for both types of networks, the introduc-
tion of competition, deregulation, in part of the network has a positive e®ect on
aggregate consumer welfare. However, consumers in transfer markets lose be-
cause, under the assumption that they do not transfer to a competing airline's
°ight, their schedule delay and travel time costs increase. Furthermore, industry
pro¯t decreases after deregulation.
In the case of leg competition in a one hub model, the positive consumer
surplus e®ect dominates the pro¯t loss, resulting in an increase in overall consumer
surplus. In the case of hub competition, the pro¯t loss dominates, so that there
19is a net welfare decrease.
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